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Abstract – Westinghouse is currently conducting the pre-application licensing of the International Reactor Innovative and 
Secure (IRIS). The design philosophy of the IRIS has been based on the concept of Safety-by-DesignTM and within this 
framework the PSA is being used as an integral part of the design process. The basis for the PSA contribution to the design 
phase of the reactor is the close iteration between the PSA team and the design and safety analysis team. In this process the 
design team is not only involved in the initial phase of providing system information to the PSA team, allowing in this way the 
identification of the high risk scenarios, but it is also receiving feedback from the PSA team that suggests design modification 
aimed at reaching risk-related goals. 
During the first iteration of this process, the design modifications proposed by the PSA team allowed reducing the initial 
estimate of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) due to internal events from 2E-6/ry to 2E-8/ry. Since the IRIS design is still in a 
development phase, a number of assumptions have to be confirmed when the design is finalized. 
Among key assumptions are the success criteria for both the accident sequences analyzed and the systems involved in the 
mitigation strategies.  The PSA team developed the initial accident sequence event trees according to the information from 
the preliminary analysis and feasibility studies. A recent coupling between the RELAP and GOTHIC codes made possible the 
actual simulation of all LOCA sequences identified in the first draft of the Event Trees. Working in close coordination, the 
PSA and the safety analysis teams developed a matrix case of sequences not only with the purpose of testing the assumed 
success criteria, but also with the perspective of identifying alternative sequences developed mainly by relaxing the extremely 
conservative assumptions previously made. 
The results of these simulations, bounded themselves with conservative assumptions on the Core Damage definition, 
suggested two new versions of the LOCA Event Tree with two possible configurations of the Automatic Depressurization 
System. The new CDF has been evaluated for both configurations and the design team has been provided with an additional 
and risk-related perspective that will help choosing the design alternative to be implemented. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure) is 
a modular 1000 MWt (~ 335 MWe) light water reactor 
with an integral configuration, which has been under 
development since October 1999 by an international team 
led by Westinghouse Electric Co. and currently 
comprising 21 organizations from ten countries. The IRIS 
design characteristics, as well as its safety features have 
been reported in several prior publications (see e.g. Refs. 
1-2) and are therefore not repeated here. 
IRIS is presently undergoing pre-application 
licensing [3] with the USNRC with the goal of attaining 
final design approval by 2010 on the road to deployment 
of the first IRIS module by 2015 or even slightly earlier. 
IRIS has been primarily focused on achieving a 
design with innovative safety characteristics. The first line 
of defense in IRIS (a Level 0 of the defense-in-depth 
philosophy) is to eliminate event initiators that could 
potentially lead to core damage. In IRIS, this concept is 
implemented through the “Safety-by-Design”TM approach, 
which has been already presented in several papers (see 
for example refs 1,2 and 4). To fully achieve the potential 
of improved safety performance inherent in the IRIS 
Safety-by-DesignTM, a Risk-informed approach to the 
design phase has been adopted as one of the key features 
to increase the overall safety of the IRIS reactor. 
In the IRIS approach, the usage of Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) is required from the very 
beginning of the design phase and also implies a very 
close interaction between the PSA team and the design 
and safety analysis teams. 
In this paper, the application to the design of 
probabilistic analysis results related to internal events will 
be presented. 
 
II. RISK-INFORMED APPROACH 
 
The Risk-Informed approach to the design phase of 
the reactor can be depicted as an evolution of the PSA 
procedure that is currently adopted in the nuclear 
industry. In order to better understand how this approach 
impacted the initial design phase of the reactor and what 
makes it different from a classical PSA approach, we can 
refer to Fig.1. On the upper part we can see how a 
classical PSA procedure can be schematized, with the 
design and safety analysis teams providing information to 
the PSA team necessary to analyze and identify the most 
relevant risk scenarios. Since for licensing purpose a PSA 
procedure is usually initiated during the late design phase, 
the initial set of information provided by the design team 
can be updated and revised according to the development 
of the project. The flow of information, however, remains 
substantially one-way,  with the PSA  results used  only to  
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Fig. 1. PSA and Risk-informed design procedures 
 
provide insights on the safety of the project, usually 
mostly for verification and with limited impact on the 
plant design. 
A Risk-informed design approach couples the PSA 
procedure described above with a structured feedback 
from the PSA to the design side. PSA results now have a 
direct influence on the plant design, rather then simply 
following its development. 
A Risk-informed design approach is therefore not 
only a matter of initiating the PSA at the very beginning 
of the design phase; it also and overall implies an 
iterative, structured and close interaction between the 
PSA team and the design and safety analysis team. As a 
result of this interaction, two somehow different points of 
view on the design (probabilistic and deterministic) are 
coupled and harmonized, with a significant benefit in 
terms of overall plant safety. 
The main “drawback” of such an approach is that 
probabilistic studies need to be initiated at a very early 
stage of the design, when several required design 
information may only be partially or qualitatively 
available. This requires a more flexible approach to 
probabilistic analysis than used in the past, and will be 
described in this paper. 
 
II.A.  Initial model development and first iteration 
 
The IRIS Preliminary PSA has been initiated on 
February 2003, as a joint effort by four members of the 
IRIS team (Westinghouse, Polytechnic of Milan, Tokyo 
Institute of Technology and Mexico National Institute for 
Nuclear Studies). 
This initial PSA model for IRIS has been developed 
while the design was still evolving from a conceptual to a 
preliminary design stage. Where the status of the design 
was not sufficient to provide all the PSA modeling inputs, 
the design team relied on engineering considerations to 
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provide reasonable assumptions as to what the final 
design would be in terms of performance requirements. 
For example, qualitative analysis of accident events was 
used to complete the safety analyses for areas where 
quantitative analyses were not yet available. In other 
cases, conclusions on the IRIS design and response were 
based on the declared similarity with other advanced 
Westinghouse PWR, such as the AP600/AP1000 design 
(mainly for support and secondary systems). 
This approach resulted in a relevant number of 
assumptions. A fundamental part of this initial PSA stage 
was therefore the documentation and monitoring of all 
these assumptions for further analysis and confirmation of 
their actual applicability. The IRIS PSA Assumptions 
Database is also the primary qualitative tool used to store 
and document all the foreseen source of uncertainties: to 
each assumption that is included in the database is 
associated a degree of uncertainty that is connected with 
the kind of design or analysis information that are still 
required. The database, as well as the uncertainty degree 
of each assumption, is continuously updated as the 
development of the design makes further IRIS-specific 
information available. 
A detailed description of the development of the PSA 
model has been already presented in a previous paper [5] 
and it is therefore only briefly summarized here.  
The starting point for the construction of a PSA 
model is the identification of the Initiating Events (IE): 
for IRIS this step was originated by a review of the 
classical lists of PWR initiating events in EPRI NP-2230 
[6], NUREG/CR-3862 [7] and NUREG/CR-5750 [8].  
These initiating events were carefully reviewed to identify 
those that are still applicable to the IRIS design.  The 
Safety-by-DesignTM approach used by IRIS has in fact led 
to the elimination of several classical event initiators such 
as large LOCAs, RCP seals LOCAs, Control Rod 
Ejection, all eliminated by the integral IRIS configuration.  
The SGTR are expected to be reduced in frequency 
as well, due to the enhanced features of the once-trough, 
helical coil SGs. The evaluation of the SGTR Initiating 
Event Frequency (IEF) is the most representative example 
of the approach used to quantitatively address the 
uncertainty due to the preliminary design. The 
engineering considerations originated by the review of the 
SG failure modes still applicable to IRIS and of the 
impact of the enhanced IRIS SG features on the IEF, led 
to the development of various possible alternatives of the 
model used to establish the overall failure frequency. 
Such alternatives were then combined by the means of a 
decision tree through a set of degrees of belief associated 
to each of the possible alternative. 
For each initiator, the plant response to the challenge 
was evaluated with respect to the key safety functions 
(see [9]). The response of the plant to various 
combinations of successes and failures of the systems 
supporting each safety function was evaluated to 
determine whether the postulated combination of 
successes and failures will result in core damage or if the 
plant will achieve a safe, stable state. This was an 
interactive process between the PSA analysts, the safety 
analysts and the designers. Since most PSA accident 
sequences involve multiple failure in the safety (and in 
any pertinent non-safety) systems that go beyond the 
safety analyses (Chapter 15 analyses) that are used as the 
starting point for determining the general thermal 
hydraulic (TH) behavior for each event, the sequences for 
each initiator were reviewed with the safety analysts and 
designers to determine if the sequences were consistent 
with their expectations of the plant response.  
The probabilities of failure of the systems involved in 
the analyzed sequences were evaluated by the means of a 
classical fault tree analysis. Standard modeling techniques 
were used to develop the fault tree models for the IRIS 
safety systems.  The models include pumps, valves, heat 
exchangers, motive and control power, and actuation 
signals. Modeled failure modes include demand failures, 
run failures, standby failures and common cause failures, 
as appropriate.  The preliminary design of the main IRIS 
safety systems was essentially complete so development 
of the models was straightforward. However, there was 
limited design information for the support systems.  For 
the fluid support systems such as cooling water, the PSA 
analysts developed simplified system design diagrams 
based on system descriptions in the Safety Analysis 
Report and the system P&IDs from the equivalent 
AP1000 systems.  These “PSA designs” were reviewed 
by the system designers to ensure that they were 
consistent with the designers’ understanding of the 
intended design and operation of the system. A power 
system model was developed based on the AP1000 power 
system design; the PSA analysts also assigned loads 
allocation, equipment control and motive power to the 
various buses based on elementary train separation 
considerations. The “PSA designs” were then used to 
complete the needed fault tree models. 
The IRIS PSA used generic data for quantification of 
the models. The primary data sources used were the EPRI 
PSA Key Assumptions and Ground Rules (KAG) 
document [10], and the database used for the AP1000 
PSA [11].  As needed, this information was supplemented 
by data from the NUCLARR database [12].  The Multiple 
Greek Letter (MGL) approach was used for modeling 
common cause failure with the appropriate factors again 
extracted from the AP1000 PSA or the KAG. 
The primary feedback to the design team that was 
provided by the first analysis of the system by PSA 
techniques was focused on both systems performance and 
sequences analysis.  
The first contribution of the PSA to the plant design 
and safety analyses was that it provided an improved 
understanding of the plant response to various initiators. 
For example, the unavailability of the Automatic 
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Depressurization System (ADS) following a small break 
LOCA in the lower part of the vessel (i.e. due to Direct 
Vessel Injection – DVI – line break) was identified by the 
PSA team as one of the dominant high risk scenario. The 
design and safety analysis teams responded by further 
investigating the potentiality of the Emergency Heat 
Removal System (EHRS) in order to evaluate its 
capability to provide adequate depressurization during the 
cooling phase. The preliminary safety analysis did not 
conceived mixed sequence (where only some train of the 
EHRS was working and with a partial ADS availability) 
since this was not required by the design basis scenarios 
(typically based on the single-failure assumption) usually 
considered during this phase of the design process. After 
these considerations the firstly assumed success criteria 
were modified. 
The  lack  of  details  related  to  system  performance 
induced the adoption of the concept of “bellwether 
sequences” for sanity checks for sequence analysis. A 
“bellwether sequence” is a core damage sequence that 
reflects a key simplifying assumption. These sequences 
typically involve only an initiator and one system failure 
and the associated core damage frequency can be 
estimated by a preliminary hand calculation.  The hand 
calculation of the frequency provides a quick check on the 
potential impact of the simplifying assumption on overall 
core damage frequency. If the impact is felt to be large 
enough to be of concern, the assumption and associated 
sequence are examined in more detail to determine if 
additional mitigation paths could be credited, additional 
best estimate TH analyses would be needed to revise the 
assumption, or the assumption is appropriate. For the last 
condition, designers could then determine if a design 
change is warranted or the risk impact is acceptable at that 
point of the design phase.   
One example of this procedure involves the 
Emergency Boration System (EBS). The initial design 
assumption was that actuation of the EBS was required 
for reactivity control following a LOCA and that failure 
of the system would lead to core damage due to a return 
to power. The approximated core damage frequency 
contribution for the sequences involving failure of the 
EBS was of the order of 4E-8/ry, which was felt to be too 
large to be acceptable for this particular scenario.  A re-
evaluation of the EBS and sequences related assumptions 
indicated two possible solutions. First, the design team 
determined that the chemical volume control system 
(CVCS) makeup pumps provided sufficient flow of 
borated water to maintain reactivity control and should be 
modeled as an alternate success path for boron injection.  
Second, the safety analysts indicated that the assumption 
was very conservative and that it would probably be 
possible to demonstrate that EBS injection was not 
needed based on the expected post-LOCA temperatures 
and as long as all of the control rods were inserted (no 
stuck rod).  Additional best-estimate transient analyses 
were still needed to confirm this, but based on the safety 
analyst input EBS injection was not modeled as a required 
response for LOCA transient initiators. 
The second major contribution of the initial PSA to the 
IRIS design was relative to the systematic addressing and 
solving of Common Cause Failures (CCF) groups. To 
make an example, CCF was affecting the availability of the 
EHRS that was initially designed with redundant but 
completely identical discharge lines. Also in this case, early 
safety analyses did not consider CCF in their scope, as they 
were traditionally based on the single-failure criterion (that 
can be briefly summarized as follows: safety analyses are 
performed assuming all non-safety grade systems to be 
unavailable, and all safety systems to be available, with 
however a single most severe failure considered). As an 
example, CCF event related to the failure of  all the 
identical air operated EHRS discharge valves was 
identified by the PSA team as a potentially, even if 
unlikely, high risk event. The design and safety analysis 
teams responded by introducing a further diversification in 
the type of valves to be used in the discharge section of the 
EHRS (see Fig.2). Such a diversification, when coupled 
with the already envisioned redundancy, led to an increased 
reliability of the system and therefore a reduction to the 
plant CDF. The PSA team provided therefore a broader 
risk-based perspective that appears extremely useful in the 
initial phase of the design when the main systems design 
has not yet been completed with a detailed design of the 
undergoing support systems. 
 
II.B. PSA model and design parallel evolution  
 
Following the completion of the first PSA iteration, that 
resulted in the overall plant internal event CDF lowered 
from the initial value of 2E-6/ry (which is already well 
below the current regulation and close to the value 
projected   for  advanced  LWR  designs)  to  2E-8/ry,  the  
 
 
Fig. 2. Layout of a single train of the EHRS. The 
redundant but identical discharge lines are highlighted 
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TABLE I. Current results 
Initiator IEF CDF % 
Reactor vessel rupture 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 51.03 
Loss of Offsite Power 1.18E-01 3.48E-09 17.78 
Loss of Support Systems 1.95E-02 2.43E-09 12.42 
ATWS 1 1.83E-09 9.34 
Transients with main 
feedwater 
8.54E-01 8.37E-10 4.27 
Loss of Condenser 8.50E-02 4.78E-10 2.44 
Isolable Secondary Line 
Break (SLB) 
5.96E-04 1.80E-10 0.92 
Not isolable SLB 3.72E-04 1.10E-10 0.56 
SGTR 1.88E-04 5.48E-11 0.28 
Interfacing System LOCA 5.00E-11 5.00E-11 0.26 
DVI Line break 1.32E-04 4.78E-11 0.24 
Loss of main feedwater 6.05E-02 4.76E-11 0.24 
Upper LOCA 8.85E-04 4.12E-11 0.21 
Power excursion 4.50E-03 2.10E-12 0.01 
RCS leakage 6.65E-03 3.99E-13 <0.01 
ADS line break 6.49E-06 2.55E-14 <0.01 
Total 1.96E-08 
   Notes: 
1. Due to the conservative assumptions adopted during the 
modeling of the ATWS scenarios, Initiating Event Frequency for 
ATWS events has been evaluated by adding the IEF of all the 
initiators leading to an high pressure accident scenario. 
 
II.B. PSA model and design parallel evolution  
 
focus of the PSA team moved to the continuous 
refinement of the large assumptions database that was 
generated during the performance of the initial PSA 
effort. 
While this has been a continuous process that is still 
ongoing, it can be divided in phases, each phase focused 
on one of the major assumptions categories. Table I 
summarizes the results in terms of CDF for the at-power 
internal IEs at the end of the first PSA application. The 
internal events CDF history is summarized in Fig.3. The 
iterative relationship between the PSA and the design 
team is clearly indicated in the spikes in the CDF that can 
be seen after the dramatic reduction of the initial values 
due to the already described first iteration. CDF spikes are 
usually due to the PSA model being updated and refined; 
such refinements can bring light to some new issues to be 
discussed and addressed with the design team. The most 
visible spike in Fig.3 is for example due to the Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) that, along with the 
implementation of several design modifications identified 
during the first PSA iteration, has been one of the main 
areas of work during the second phase of the PSA 
development. 
IRIS has been designed in order to be the least 
dependent possible from human intervention, due to the 
Safety-by-DesignTM and the highly automated and passive 
safety systems. As a result, the main contribution to CDF 
due to human errors is concentrated in those sequences 
involving the complete failure of the EHRS and the 
initiation of the Once Through Core Cooling (OTCC) 
strategy. The human errors considered in the preliminary  
1.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
Model Evolution
CDF
1.96E-06
1.96E-08
 
Fig. 3. Internal Event CDF history for the IRIS 
 
stage are mainly post initiator human errors regarding the 
emergency response phase. The task analysis for the 
operator actions needed in emergency  response was  
developed in  close cooperation with the design team 
since many of the elements regarding the information 
available for the control room and the related commands 
are not yet part of the available schemes. Therefore the 
assumptions have been stored in the database mentioned 
above and connected to the human actions assessed for 
the PSA. All these assumptions will constitute a precious 
source of information during the Control Room Design 
phase, as well as for the development of the Emergency 
Response Guidelines. A critical information for the 
assessment of Human Errors Probability was the time 
window available for each critical action. An example is 
the action: “manual activation of the Start-up Feed Water 
(SFW) system” in transient scenario. Analyzing this task 
the TH simulations enabled to clarify that in those 
scenario the actual sequence foresees the automatic 
actuation of the EHRS before any operator action can 
actually take place; the automatic sequence in fact occurs 
in such a brief time interval that no human action can 
actually be performed before it. Therefore the operator 
intervention was considered only as a recovery in case of 
failure of the automatic activation sequence for the 
EHRS: “the manual activation of the SFW pumps will 
follow the failure of the EHRS automatic activation and 
its first manual backup”. These findings are actually in 
line with the “hand off” design philosophy as well. The 
results of the preliminary HRA analysis highlighted that 
the contribution of human error to the CDF is quite 
limited.. As mentioned above, one of the most critical 
operator actions is the one related to the manual activation 
of the ADS during the OTCC procedure. This enabled the 
PSA team to focus its attention, together with the design 
team, on a more thorough analysis of the actual sequence 
and the definition of a procedure improved with the 
consideration of human reliability principles. As a result 
the importance of the human error contribution 
diminished since the first OTCC strategy changed 
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following a more detailed description of the system 
response. 
A second major improvement of the IRIS PSA model 
obtained during the second phase was the inclusion in the 
model of an accident category not fully analyzed during 
the first iteration: Anticipated Transients Without scram. 
This accident category was initially assumed to be a 
minor contributor to the overall IRIS CDF. The very low 
level of CDF obtained for IRIS made the verification of 
such assumption a mandatory step during the second PSA 
phase. 
 The ATWS evaluation involved again joint efforts 
between the PSA team and the IRIS core/plant designers 
and transient analysts to determine ATWS consequences 
as a function of physics parameters and availability of 
plant features (e.g., number of safety valves, alternative 
shutdown systems, etc.). The most severe ATWS 
transients are characterized by a large power mismatche 
between the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the main 
steam system (MSS). Major factors that mitigate these 
AWTS transients are 1) primary system coolant volume 
capability of absorbing the power mismatch, 2) 
pressurizer safety valve capacity to limit pressure 
increases and 3) a negative moderator reactivity 
coefficient to shut down core power generation as the 
reactor coolant temperature increases/density decreases. 
The IRIS design inherently includes much larger RCS and 
pressurizer volumes, relative to core power, compared to 
current PWRs. Therefore, the IRIS RCS pressure and 
temperature would rise more slowly during an ATWS 
transient, providing more time for moderator feedback to 
reduce core power. The IRIS PSA team then worked with 
the IRIS design team and transient analysts to perform 
sensitivity studies on the pressurizer safety valve area and 
reactor moderator coefficient to obtain parameter sets that 
resulted in acceptable ATWS consequences (i.e., peak 
RCS pressure <22 Mpa). From these sensitivity studies, 
the team members identified an improved design set of 
pressurizer safety valves that resulted in an ATWS 
contribution to CDF of 1.7E-9/ry. This is less than 10% of 
the current overall CDF. 
This iterative process of assumption review and 
verification and the resulting design details that need to be 
more deeply investigated keep the PSA model and the 
actual design in close correlation.   
 
III. LOCA ASSUMPTIONS REVIEW 
 
What we are outlining here is clearly a recursive 
procedure that must be updated every time a new piece of 
information about the design or the analysis upon with the 
assumptions are based become available.  
Even if the procedure of assumption reviewing has been 
already described with some examples in  the previous 
section, it is worthwhile to pay  particular attention to a 
third iteration of the methodology that we are here 
outlining, since the main focus of this so far last iteration 
was on LOCAs. Several early assumptions relative to the 
response to SBLOCA were made in the initial 
development of the IRIS PSA model; as a results of these 
assumptions, often based only upon preliminary safety 
analyses, a classical high-risk accident category was 
reduced to impact for just around 1% on the overall CDF.  
The third iteration of this risk-informed approach has 
therefore been a critical one since the success criteria for 
LOCA have been finally tested with a more complete set 
of TH simulations. These simulations were made possible 
by a recent coupling between GOTHIC and RELAP 
codes. 
 
III.A.  GOTHIC and RELAP coupling  
 
The IRIS novel LOCA safety approach poses some new 
issues for computational and analysis methods since the 
IRIS integral reactor coolant system and containment are 
strongly coupled, and the system response is based on this 
interaction. A preliminary assessment has led to the 
conclusion that in order to develop an appropriate 
evaluation model for the IRIS SBLOCA, the 
containment/vessel coupling had to be correctly captured 
[13]. For this reason a coupled RELAP/GOTHIC model 
was developed by the University of Zagreb. A simple 
direct coupling of the modified version of RELAP5 
mod3.3 [14] used for IRIS analyses and GOTHIC [15] 
was used with connections at the points of hydraulic 
contact (the break, ADS, and gravity makeup flow paths). 
The connections are comprised of a time dependent 
volume component on the RELAP5 side (representing the 
containment backpressure) and a flow boundary condition 
(to provide the mass and energy release term) on 
GOTHIC side. The existing detailed RELAP5 model of 
the reactor coolant system and of the engineered safety 
features is used for these analyses, together with a 
simplified GOTHIC model of the containment. The 
RELAP/GOTHIC coupling developed for IRIS analyses 
has been described in [16]. 
The RELAP5 model of the Reactor Coolant System 
has been described in previous papers [17] and is shown 
in Fig. 4. The same RELAP5 plant model used for Non-
LOCA analysis has been used, with the only differences 
related to the contact points between the reactor coolant 
system and the containment model, and some modeling 
improvements to better represents plant systems important 
for LOCA analyses (e.g. the ADS and DVI). The 
containment model used for these analyses has also been 
discussed in previous papers [19] and is shown in Fig. 5. 
The IRIS Small Break LOCA evaluation model was 
updated on the basis of the results of the IRIS SBLOCA 
Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) 
[18]. 
With this relatively mature evaluation model, the 
SBLOCA  event  tree  was evaluated jointly by the design  
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Fig. 4. Reactor Coolant System Model for RELAP5 Used 
in IRIS Safety Analyses 
 
and PSA team, with special attention to the key 
assumptions made in evaluating the performance of the 
system. The key subsystems whose success or failure had 
a critical impact on the PSA results were identified. These 
systems can be grouped in different categories as follows: 
decay heat removal (Passive Containment Cooling 
System - PCCS - and EHRS) and coolant injection to the 
RCS (Normal Residual Heat Removal System - NRHRS - 
and Chemical & Volume Control System - CVCS, 
Emergency Boration System - EBS, Long-term Gravity 
Makeup System - LGMS - and indirectly the ADS, which 
equalizing pressure between the RCS and the containment 
allows for gravity injection,). In general, since both 
functions are required for a successful mitigation, at least 
one system for each category is required. 
Based on these evaluations, a matrix of relevant cases 
to be analyzed with different combinations of 
assumptions relative to the 7 critical items identified 
above was prepared, with the added complexity that the 
EHRS is not an "available" or "not-available" system, but 
rather different numbers of available trains (1 to 4) need 
to be addressed. A detailed discussion of the test matrix 
goes beyond the purpose of this paper, and it will suffice 
to say that the evaluation matrix was developed 
considering not only deterministic, but also probabilistic 
(in terms of dominant sequences) considerations. 
 
III.B.  PSA Model modifications 
 
The Standards for Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
provided by ASME [19] suggest the definition of Core 
Damage as an uncovery and heatup of the reactor core to 
the point at which prolonged oxidation and severe fuel 
damage is anticipated and involving enough of the core to 
cause a significant release. In the current preliminary IRIS 
PSA, a more conservative definition of CD has been used,  
 
Fig. 5. Simplified Containment Model for GOTHIC 3.4 
Used in IRIS Safety Analyses 
 
i.e. a simple prolonged core uncovery has been considered 
as a synonym for core damage. Such a definition has been 
used in order to bound the uncertainties initially expected 
due to the preliminary design phase of the reactor and 
especially considering the lack of a complete set of TH 
analysis. 
According to the definition of core damage used and 
relying on the capability provided by the described 
coupling between GOTHIC and RELAP, the results of the 
test matrix cases have been used not only to provide 
confirmation of the assumed success criteria but also to 
explore additional success paths initially not credited due 
to the high degree of uncertainties. 
One of the most relevant assumptions that has been 
confirmed during this simulation campaign (and that was 
introduced in section IIA) refers to the actual 
demonstration that the boration function provided by the 
Emergency Boration System is not required in order to 
maintain the subcriticality of the reactor for all the LOCA 
cases analyzed, once the reactivity control is assured by 
the success of the control rods. The EBS has therefore 
been retained for further analysis, apart from ATWS 
cases, only because it can be credited for a small extra 
inventory that could be decisive in some near success 
sequences. 
Because of the conservative assumptions adopted for 
the definition of the success criteria as well as for the core 
damage definition itself, some assumptions, usually 
involving the number of EHRS trains required for the 
mitigation  strategy,   have  been  relaxed  and  the  LOCA 
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Fig. 6. a) Original ADS design. b) 2 lines ADS design. 
c) 3 lines ADS design 
 
Event Trees have been consequentially simplified. 
In order to provide confirmation of the success 
criteria, the design team realized the need for tuning some 
details of the design. The Automatic Depressurization 
System is an explicative example since, in order to grant 
an adequate depressurization in case of multiple failure of 
EHRS, slightly enhanced performances of the ADS will 
be required, namely an increased available flow; thus the 
original ADS design has been modified. 
The original ADS consisted of two lines that were 
originally connected through a common header to the 
same safety relief valve line; while the enhanced ADS 
version implies that each ADS line is now connected to a 
different safety relief valve line (see Fig.6 a,b). This new 
configuration enables to have more than one line fully 
opened, which in turns grants an increased 
depressurization ratio that can lead some sequences to 
success. It must be noticed that this is not a violation of 
the single failure principle since the deterministic safety 
analyses will still be based on this principle, and it is only 
for beyond design basis sequences involving multiple 
failures in the safety systems that the improved design 
becomes important. 
In addition to this modification, the PSA team has 
been requested to provide the risk impact of two 
alternative ADS designs (see Fig. 6 b,c): as already 
explained, the first option imply that the ADS is provided 
with two enlarged lines that are both requested for the 
mitigation of some advanced sequences; while in the 
second option the ADS is provided with a third additional 
line, connected with the third available safety relief valve 
line. At first it was thought that the second option should 
increase the reliability of the entire plant, however the 
PSA analysis shows that the addition of a third ADS line, 
even if results in an increase of the ADS reliability, is 
going to grant success only for some not primary 
sequences while, on the other hand, the additional ADS 
line slightly increases the Initiating Event Frequency 
(IEF) for the spurious ADS actuation event, as well as for 
the LOCA from the upper part of the vessel. Thus the risk 
informed decision process provides in this case additional 
and useful information for the finalization of a design that 
can be optimized under a broader set of perspectives. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A risk-informed approach to the design phase of a 
nuclear power plant is something more than the simple 
initiation of the PSA at the very beginning of the design. 
The close interaction and the feedback that the design 
team can obtain from the PSA team are of paramount 
importance to better integrate the two sometimes not 
easily compatible viewpoints. Several examples have 
been provided in this paper to illustrate how the PSA can 
be applied at an early design stage and developed in 
parallel to a design that it contributes to define. 
IRIS has taken full benefits from such an approach in 
achieving an internal events CDF as low as 2E-8/ry. The 
risk-informed approach has helped the design team to 
focus the attention on some risk-significant scenarios, but 
has also led to some significant design modifications and 
is also providing risk-related information to be used in the 
decision making process regarding the finalization of the 
design. IRIS is therefore using the risk-informed approach 
to the design phase in the most complete fashion. 
Such a good result for the IRIS CDF has brought to an 
additional challenge to the PSA analysts since its  value is 
now close to the order of magnitude of some kind of 
events that used to be considered as scarcely relevant. 
This is also true for some major assumptions usually 
considered conservatives in the framework of internal 
events and that in the case of IRIS resulted in generating 
relevant contributors to the CDF, such as the reactor 
vessel rupture initiating event frequency evaluation.  
 
As described, the Level-1 IRIS PSA is being used in 
all possible extent in order to provide useful insights and 
guidance to the design of the IRIS NSSS and even to the 
BOP. The application of the herein described 
methodology is in principle applicable also to external 
events analysis as well as to the Level 2 of the PSA, i.e. 
containment performance. 
It must be considered that, when dealing for example 
with external events, the amount of assumptions to be 
considered is even more extended if compared with the 
internal-event analyses, with the additional complication 
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of a general lack of detailed information in the literature. 
Nevertheless, a first application of the herein presented 
methodology to the external event analysis for IRIS has 
been initiated by the Lithuanian Energy Institute [20].  
The extension of this methodology to the Level 2 
PSA has so far been anticipated with the development of a 
preliminary LERF model [21] that has been used in order 
to understand the major information that will be needed 
from the design team in order to apply the risk-informed 
approach to the design finalization of the IRIS 
containment. 
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